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ABSTRACT
In recenttyears, interest has grown in the idea of contracting with
private firms to provide social services which have previously been
provided directly by government agencies. A desire for greater quality
is the primary motivation for "privatizing" government functions. Aside
from bringing the supposed efficiency and problem-solving ability of
private firms into the provision of social services, privatization may
also provide a more effective set of checks and balances in the deter-
mination of quality and types of service made available to the public.
The major weakness of any privatization program would be in the resolution
of conflicts between the value structures of private enterprise and
social service. These issues in public-private cooperation in providing
social services were brought out in the nineteenth century, where the
problem of the relationship between public and private sectors was one
of bringing existing private firms providing social services under
public regulation. A system of public services by private firms under
public regulation began to develop into its modern form in the field of
transportationnby the late eighteen hundreds.
Such a development in transportation management, from uncontrolled
private enterprise to a balance of power between public and private
interests, occurred in the field of rapid transit in Boston between
1887 and 1902. It was during this period that the first segments of
Boston's rapid transit system were built. As the political climate
changed over these years, the initiative in the development of this
system gradually passed from private entrepeneurs interested in cashing
in on the current boom in electric traction to public agencies attempting
to promote the public interest. These agencies included the state
legislature, the Massachusetts Board of Railroad Commissioners, the
Boston City Council, and the city-controlled Boston Transit Commission.
Between 1902 and 1918, there prevailed a state of greater or lesser
equilibrium between the private firm that operated Boston's transit
system, the Boston Elevated Railway Company, and the public bodies
charged with its regulation. This system was in many ways similar to
the type of public-private cooperation contemplated at present. The
system succeeded to the extent that it allowed for Boston's rapid transit
network to expand to nearly its present size. The company, through its
regulators, was also quite responsive to consumer demands for better
service. (However, the system ultimately failed because it did not
provide adequate compensation to the railway company for its services.
The state's adoption of a cost-of-service approach to financing public
transportation could not sustain the system in the face of new competing
modes of transportation after 1918.
I.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, interest has grown in the idea of contracting
with private firms to provide social services which have previously been
provided directly by government agencies. This program of "privatization"
has been attempted in fields so diverse as elementary education and the
rehabilitation of juvenile delinquents. A desire for greater quality is
the primary motivation for privatizing government functions. The values
and problem-solving techniques of private firms might bring new efficiency
and competence into the provision of social services. The very bringing
of the private sector into this new field might introduce new perspectives
that would lead to innovation. Most important, however, contracting with
private firms would put a new separation between the agencies providing
social services, and the agencies whose duty is the evaluation of the pro-
vision of those services. While a private organization would provide the
service under the contract system, performance criteria would still be
determined and enforced by a public agency. This could be a decided im-
provement over the present system, where government bureaucracies both
decide what type of service to provide, and have the almost exclusive
power to evaluate its effectiveness. Privatization may thus provide a
more effective set of checks and balances in the determination of the
quality and types of service made available to the public.
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The major weakness in the privatization program is in the resolu-
tion of the conflicting value structures of private enterprise and social
service. The supporters of privatization make the traditional American
capitalist assumption, on the one hand, that private enterprise, respond-
ing to economic motivations, is more efficient and innovative than govern-
ment. Furthermore, they assume that there will be some differences
between public and private values, and that this influence of a different
system of values will be beneficial to the quality of service provided.
This would indicate that private enterprise under contract to the govern-
ment should te given a rather free hand in its operation. But-past
experience with regulated private firms providing social services indicates
clearly that these firms, if not closely controlled, will tend to exploit
the public they are intended to serve. Operating to maximize its econo-
mic return, the private contractor will do what it can to influence the
agencies that regulate it to increase its profits, rather than for any
social ends that are not incidental to this purpose. Debates between
private and public agencies will follow this profit vs. service division,
rather than one of debate simply over which method of service is best for
the service's clients, though of course, both sides may state their case
in terms of the social benefits it will provide. Although private enter-
prise may be efficient, vigorous, and so forth, it is so for its ends,
rather than for society's, which a public bureaucracy must make at least
a minimal effort to deal with. However, if the public sector has tight
control over the enterprise, it can hardly be said that there are checks
and balances in the system, other than that the private firm must show a
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profit if it is to continue to provide the service; so, that, whenever
a large capital investment is required of a private firm, intensive
public regulation, responding to non-economic valUes, may discourage
private investment altogether. All this makes public regulation of
a private firm providing a public service rather difficult business.
The objective of this sort of public regulation of a private firm
providing an important public service, then, must be tne achievement of
an equilibrium between public and private influence where both sectors
derive sufficient benefits to make participation in the enterprise
worthwhile to them. These issues in publ? c-private cooperation in pro-
viding social services were first brought cut in regulation in the nine-
teenth centruy, where the problem of the relationship between the public
and private sectors was one of bringing existing private firms under
public direction. It is this convergence of intentions that gives his-
toric examples of public-private cooperation significance to the present
movement for privatization.
A system of provision of public services by private firms under
public regulation began early to develop into its modern form in the
field of transportation in the nineteenth centruy. In spite of the
reverence for laissez-faire economics that prevailed in the eighteen
hundreds, it was gradually recognized that transportation enterprises
generated external economic effects that were of greater importance
to the public in general than to the individual firms engaged in the
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business. This was first expressed in the granting of subsidies by
the states and the federal government to encourage railroad construc-
tion, and the continuous competition among towns for selection as
stopping points on railroad lines. The monopolistic tendencies of
rail transportation that became more obvious as it developed decisively
supported the case for regulation. The operation of both of these
factors was particularly important in the field of street railways.
They supplied the accessibility that was vital to the evolving indus-
trial metropolis. Once street railways had permitted the rapid subur-
banization of the last three decades of the nineteenth century, the
city became increasingly dependent upon their continued operation of
a cheap efficient service. Street railway location was also an
important determinant of land use and value. And their operation
required exclusive control of large parts of the public thoroughfares.
Such a development of regulation of public transit, from uncon-
trolled private enterprise.to a balance of power between public and
private interests, occurred in Boston between 1887 and 1902. It was
during this period that the first segments of Boston's rapid transit
system were built. As the political climate changed over these
fifteen years, the initiative in the development of.this system
gradually passed from private enterpeneurs and promoters interested
in cashing in on the current boom in electric traction to public
agencies attempting to promote the public interest. The necessity
of rapid transit to the public welfare was recognized from the very
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beginning of thi.s period. Even the most intensely capitalistic pro-
moters seeking franchises for rapid transit schemes had to state
their programs in terms of the social benefits they would provide.
But only gradually was its provision designated a public responsi-
bility. By 1902, after a series of conflicts over rapid transit
policy in the Massachusetts Legislature, it was established that the
public would have the initiative in rapid transit policy-making.
A private corporation, The Boston Elevated Railway Company, continued,
however, to own most of Boston's rapid transit facilities, and to
be responsible for their operation.
Between 1902 and 1918, there prevailed a state of greater or
lesser equilibrium between the Elevated Company and the public bodies
charged with its regulation. A set of ccrdial bureaucratic relation-
ships were established between the company and regulatory agencies,
replacing the graft and political maneuvering alternating with refor-
mist wrath that accompanibd early rapid transit policy-making. During
this era, most of the remainder of Boston's rapid transit system as
it now exists was constructed and put into operation. While the public
interest was considered of high importance in providing rapid transit
facilities, the laws of public utility regulation dictated that pro-
fitability must be the final criterion for any rapid transit service.
The regulatory agency responsiule for controlling the quality of
service provided, the Massachusetts Board of Railroad Commissioners,
often sided with the company against local interests who demanded
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additional transit services that would not pay for themselves. At
the same time, the company was expected to cooperate with its regula-
tors in devising ways to maximize the company's profitable services,
by being efficient and receptive to innovation. During most of this
period, this appears to be what happened. Yet by 1918 both parties
in this cooperative process were willing to acknowledge its inadequacy
and to substitute a public trusteeship for The original private mana-
gement of the Boston Elevated Railway Company.
A variety of factors contributed to thE evolution toward, and
the eventual modification of, a system of public-private cooperation
in Boston's rapid transit system. In the beginning, it was assumed
that the prime force behind the development of rapid transit facilities
should be private enterprise. There were several reasons for this.
The precedents of the regulated street railway companies in the state
seemed to be the legal context most applicable to the problem. There
was a belief that private enterprise was more efficient, aggressive,
and competent than an administration by civil servants or political
appointees could be. The existing street railway industry had in
its management a wealth of experience and expertise in transportation
that could not be duplicated. And, finally, the government preferred
to utilize private capital to achieve public ends, rather than
increase public indebtedness. Contracting with a private firm to
provide rapid transit in Boston would provide all of these advantages.
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However, in the process of allowing rapid transit development
to be handled by private enterprise, many decisions that were of
great importance to the public interest were left in private hands.
This was quite appropriate in a period when a vast program of city
expansion was taking place without government interference, as Sam
B. Warner described in Streetcar Subrubs1 . But as Warner also points
out, such private development was development for the demand of the
2
moment, with little consideration for its larger consequences2. No
matter how much rapid transit promoters might try to sell their schemes
as the easiest means to achieving the city beautiful, it is clear
that all they really knew how to do or were interested in was that
there was a consumer demand for rapid transit, and that it seemed
that providing rapid transit to meet this demand would be profitable.
If rapid transit were to serve any end but this, there would have to
be some government initiative in defining goals for a rapid transit
program, and in developing a plan to achieve such goals. This govern-
ment initiative was demanded by reformers in Boston shortly after the
private movement for rapid transit began.
In this conflict, public planning and regulation eventually
gained the upper hand. Though this process of regulation was
divided among different agencies varying in the degree of sophistica-
tion they could bring to bear on the problem, the system hung
together rather well for a decade and a half. Its demise came about
largely because of the rigidity of the policies established by the
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agencies charged with its regulation. They, in turn, were confirned
in their actions by the legislature, where the original public-private
conflict took place. The system of law surrounding the rapid transit
system had, to some extent, been created to act as an adversary to
a powerful, aggressive, private industry. The remainder of the
decision-making in rapid transit legislation had, at least the reformers
believed, been co-opted by the Boston Elevated Company. In any case,
the compromise between these two forces had been rigidly established
by statute in the late nineties and early nineteen-hundreds. It
was designed to handle the rapid transit situation as the various
actors in the situation perceived it at that time.
By 1918, however, changing economic circumstances, combined
with this rigid regulation system, had brought the company to the
verge of bankruptcy. No longer was the public interested in curtail-
ing the efforts of a powerful syndicate to reap excessive profits
from providing a public service. It was interested by this point
in keeping a severely weakened transit enterprise alive so that
Boston metropolitan area could have any rapid transit at all. The
regulatory system evolved under the bitter adversary relationship
of public and private up until the early nineteen-hundreds could
not accommodate the more cooperatively spirited rapid transit enter-
prise that both public and private interests began to require.
The development of rapid transit in Boston allows a very good
opportunity for studying three phases of public-private interaction,
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ranging from private initiative and planning under a system of
negative public regulation through private operation under a more
positive program of public regulation and planning, to full public
management of the rapid transit enterprise. It would be useful,
I feel, to examine the various decisions made in this process of
rapid transit development, and see whether the2y were made effectively,
and whether it was appropriate for any particular decision to be
handled by the public or private sector. Such empirical evidence
might give some good indications of how public and private respon-
sibility should be allocated in any currert privatization program.
It seems to me that the arrangement in the middle period, between 1902
and 1918, would represent something quite similar to the type of
balanced public-private interaction that current advocates of privati-
zation are seeking. It also appears to be the most successful period
of operation of the rapid transit system, in terms of the operation
of the system being benefic'ial both to its investors and to the public.
Of course, the development of Boston's transit system cannot be
looked upon as a controlled experiment in public administration. Too
many factors extrinsic to the relationship between the public and
private agents within the system were changing too radically to be
ignored. However, any system of regulation should be judged in part
on its ability to respond to changing circumstances in the industry
with which it is concerned. I feel that though events led to the
demise of the private management of Boston's transit facilities,
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there is evidence that this operation was not inherently unsound,
and that public management left unsolved most of the deeper problems
encountered under the previous system. Boston's rapid transit system
during the first two decades of the twentieth century, therefore, is
a good example of privatization, and demonstrates that such a system
can be advantageous.
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II. THE TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM IN BOSTON 1850 - 1890
Before we consider the merits of the management of transit in
Boston by privatization, it would be useful to examine the transit
problem as it existed in this city in the late nineteenth century,
and the events that led to the development of a rapid transit system
as a solution to this problem.
In his study of Boston in the last third of the nineteenth
century, Streetcar Suburbs, Sam B. Warner stated that downtown Boston
3
was becoming thoroughly congested as early as the eighteen fifties
It was only the coming of street railways, he hypothesized, that
allowed Boston to continue to grow by opening more land for suburban
residential development. Rail transportation was able to expand
significantly the distance which it was feasible to travel from one's
home in the suburbs to work downtown. The "Pedestrian city' , as he
described Boston within its pre-hores-car ear boundaries, had reached
its maximum density of both population and traffic . Its seventeenth-,
and eighteenth-century streets were teeming with horses, vehicles,
and pedestrians.
Better transportation, first in the form of the horsecar, and
later in form of the electric trolley, succeeded in bringing relief
to the congestion of population in downtown resideptial areas by
opening vast areas to the construction of new, relatively low-density
housing. But it only compounded the problem of traffic congestion
5in Boston's narrow, crooked, downtown streets .The addition of a
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new mode of transportation to the city's streets only succeeded in
making the traffic situation more confused. When present, street
cars took up a great deal of space, and even when the car was not
there, its irreguluarly-laid tracks obstructed the street surface.
Later, its electrical wires overhead were to become a hazard, parti-
6cularly to fire companies
As an agent of suburbanization, the streetcar appeared to be
self-reinforcing. The first rapid transit comission in its report
to the legislature in 1892 compiled figures on the number of people
entering Boston by rail annually in 1870, 1880, and 1890. Their
statistics showed that the number of passengers entering Boston
annually (the overwhelming majority of whom traveled by streetcar)
was doubling every decade7 . As a population ever more scattered
through the suburbs traveled daily to and from their jobs in the ever
more intensively built-up down-town area, a new phenomenon, the rush
hour, developed. Commenting on the commercial and financial center
between Tremont and Washington streets, the Report of 1892 stated,
"Hither, every morning, the great arterial streams of humanity are
drawn, and thence, every evening they are returned to the extremities
of the city and its suburbs, as the blood pulses to and from the
human heart, and the tides ebb and flow in the Bay 8." In the evening
rush hour, as many as two hundred streetcars per hour would pass in
each direction on Tremont Street between Boylston and Park Streets.
Two hundred streetcars in each direction approached the maximum
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capacity of this. section of the street railway system . Any greater
volume of cars would bring traffic to a complete halt. As it was,
the average car speed over this section of street during rush hour
10
was about two miles per hourl. This was caused by continual delays,
the result of cars blocking switches, and the interference of wagons
and pedestrian traffic. At six o'clock, in other words, it was faster
to walk from Park Square to Scollay Square than to take a streetcar.
Though traffic congestion had been a problem in Boston for many
years, the railway companies' adoption of electricity for motive
power to replace the horse brought the traffic problem to a real
crisis. Boston was one of the first cities to change over to electric
streetcars. Electrification proved to be immensely popular, and
soon became the dominant form of motive power for street railways in
the city. By 1896, all but thirty-six of the thirteen hundred miles
of street railway in Massachusetts were electrified1 . The last
line of horecars in the city of Boston was removed in 190012. The
same factors that made electric streetcars so attractive to street
railway owners and patrons made them a disaster for the traffic sit-
uation in downtown Boston. Electric streetcars were faster than
horsecars and so increased the radius from downtown within which it
was feasible for commuters to live. Suburban expansion in turn
increased the demand for streetcar transportation. Electric motors
were also much more powerful than horses, and the size of electric
streetcars was increased accordingly. This made street railways
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much more efficient in terms of capacityl3. The economies of scale
this brought on were significant, but the longer', bulkier electric
cars demanded even more space than the horsecars in the narrow down-
town streets of the city, and despite the increases in capacity their
greater size and speed allowed, the demand for streetcar transporta-
tion increased at an even faster rate. The result was an "invasion"
of streetcars, approaching the size of regular railroad cars rather
than of diminutive horsecar dimensions, into the streets of Boston14.
The takeover of electric streetcars was sudden and complete. The
Rapid Transit Report of 1892 hypothesized that, "If a Bostonian who
had been abroad and without tidings from home for ten years were
suddenly set down at Park-Street corner, at six o'clock of any evening,
he would not believe his eyes. The street he left a highway had
become a railway15 ." Yet the same commission had to concede that there
was no end in sight. Demand already exceeded the transportation
supply, and new means would have to be found to meet it if the city
were not to choke on the traffic in its streets.
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III. THE ORIGINAL AGENTS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF RAPID TRANSIT
A variety of public and private organizations participated in
the making of public transportation decisions for Boston. The prin-
cipal agents in early rapid transit development were the Massachusetts
General Court, the state legislature; the Board of Railraod Commis-
sioners, a regulatory commission that reported to the legislature;
the Mayor and City Council of Boston; and the city's privately owned
traction companies. Each had its own structure and its own perspec-
tive on the problem of transportation. Some had a wide variety of
interests and were forced to focus on rapid transit because certain
of their responsibilities made necessary their cooperation in rapid
transit matters. Others focused a more specific interest and exper-
tise on the on transit problems. None had been established originally
for the purpose of building a rapid transit system in Boston through
public-private cooperation. All were about to be called upon to
apply their capabilities, and their perceptions of theie duties and
interests, to an almost unprecedented problem.
One historian of Massachusetts politics considered the General
Court to have been the most progressive of any state legislature in
16the late nineteenth century6. Another however, pointed out also
that this was not saying very much1 . In growing from a Puritan
colonial community, Massachusetts had retained a conservative sense
of itself as a commonwealth, with a right to intervene in the private
affairs of its citizens for the sake of the common welfare. Both
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the legislature and the governor had to stand for election yearly 18.
This system, on the other hand, had grave disadvantages. It had a very
weak executive. The governor had little more power than to veto legis-
lation. Being required to stand for election every year, the rate of
attrition in the legislature was high. Most legislators were new and
inexperienced. Alliances and factions lasting more than one session
were difficult to establish. Committee members had no time to develop
expertise in their committee's field. At the same time, the issues
that the General Court was called upon to deal with were being more com-
plex, and the interests concerned with its decisions more diverse19
The very conservative community-orientedness of Massachusetts' political
philosophy was to become a liability when the urbanizing, industrializ-
ing, industrializing state no longer fit the model of a small, homo-
20geneous community
All of these factors made the legislature very pliable in the
hands of concerted lobbying efforts. Professional lobbyists supplied
much of the continuity from session to session that the legislature
itself lacked. They commanded the expertise and organization that
first-term legislators could not, and they used it effectively on
behalf of the private interests they represented 21. However, it
turned out that the legislature was also susceptible to lobbying
efforts on behalf of reform measures22 , and so a very unstable balance
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prevailed between public and private interests in the capitol.
The General Court had for many years directly regulated rail
transportation throughout the Commonwealth. This was accomplished
through direct legislation "in recognition of railroads as 'affected
with a public interest. '23 The General Court also was the body empowered
24to grant charters to corporations . Its use of these two powers
gave rise to many objections. Regulation was generally handled by
special legislative committees appointed to deal with specific issues
when the general court felt that matters were serious enough to warrant
an investigation. "Conducted by non-experts, the investigations as
often as not failed to secure the significant facts; and because of
their infrequency and irregularity, faileo to exert a salutary influence
upon the railroad companies."25 The granting of charters consumed a
great deal of the General Court's time, and since it was dealt with
in the same fragmentary way as railroad regulation it gave no real
power over the railway companies' policies to the state. The grant-
ing of charters was not only time consuming and ineffectual; it was
also an area which made legislators very susceptible to corruption.26
This problem was finally alleviated in 1874 by the passage of
a general incorporation law for street railways. 27 .Already, in
1871, the General Court had acted to codify street railway law.28
To provide for a consistent and continuous surveillance and rogula-
tion of railroads and street railways, the legislature established
the Board of Railroad commissioners in 1869. Its powers were analo-
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gous to those of the legislative committees. It was to make investi-
gations and publicize its findings and recommendations.29 The legis-
lature reserved the power to control railroad operations, though now
it had at its disposal a better source of information on what sort
of regulation the railroads required. This retention of power by
the legislature assured it a prominent place among the actors in
the rapid transit decision-making process.
In 1869, the General Court established the Board of Railroad
Commissioners to take over the functions of the special legislative
committees on railroads on a permanent basis. This agency was the
first permanent state regulatory board in the nation. There were
other reasons, however, for the establishment of the commission
besides the incapacity of the legislature to deal with the increas-
ingly complex problems of railroad and street railway regulation.
It was seen as a means of encouraging orderly expansion and improve-
ment of rail transportation services in the state for the benefit
of the public and private railroad investors. "Because of the increas-
ing importance of railroads and street railways in the life of the
community, it was considered advisable to safeguard investments therein
so as to attract new capital to these successful undertakings." 30
As a means of thorough and consistent law enforcement and by arbitra-
tion of disputes between transportation companies, and between the
companies and the public, it was hoped that the commission would work
toward the rationalization of street railway and railroad operations,
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so that they would provide the maximum benefit to the community, while
providing a reasonable return to their stockholders.
The commission was to be of what is known as the "weak" commis-
sion type. It was to investigate complaints and violations of the
law by railways, and report its findings to the companies and the
legislature. It was also to publish an annual report, bringing its
findings directly to the public. It had, however, no power to make
its findings binding upon the railway companies.31 Besides super-
vising the services of railway companies, the board was to investi-
gate accidents, and collect data on railway finances, returns, and
operation. 32 As time went on, the board's powers were expanded. In
1876, the board was given the power to examine the books of railway
corporations.33 In the nineties, the board was given more positive
power to regulate accommodations and service on street railways.
Most important in this respect, it was allowed to require additional
accommodation when it was seemed necessary.34 Though it was not
until after the turn of the century that the board was allowed a staff
of inspectors to enforce street railway regulations, its efforts seem
to have been effective.35 In 1893, the board was given control over
the security issue of street railway companies.36 Especially after
1898, the board was empowered to act on its own initiative in rate
regulation, rather than just on complaint.37
When the board was established in 1869, its three members were
appropriate salaries of $4,000. per year. This was a quite respect-
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able salary for public servants in nineteenth century New England, 38
and indicated the prestigious role that the legislature intended the
new commission to fulfill. Transportation regulation was a crucial
issue during this period, and the commission's lack of enforcement
powers called for statesmanship on the part of its members. "The
railroads were not compelled to put into practice the recommenda-
tions of the commission. It was their legai right to disregard
such suggestions if they so desired. The board was forced to rely
upon the- soundness and wisdom of its recommendations, reinforced by
publicity, to secure the adoption of its suggestions by the rail-
roads." 3 9 Though it later acquired much more effective means of con-
trol over railway activities, the board enjoyed great prestige even
in its early days, and was accepted as being fair and effective by
both the corporations and the community.
Statesmanship, of course, was not the only factor in the success-
ful image of the railroad commission. The main reason for the success
of the Board of Railroad Commissioners was the conservative role it
played as a regulatory body. The commission brought an order into
the chaotic process of street railway construction and operation that
was desired by traction capitalist and community al.ike. 4 0 The explo-
sive industrial growth of the US in the late nineteenth century, with
its rapid change, uncertainty, and cutthroat competition, was fully
reflected in the street railway business. The board met this challenge
by encouraging the consolidation of weaker street railway firms with
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adjacent successful ones, and revising railway fares so they would
be consistent within a given region. By taking a very narrow,
legalistic view of its role, and by not taking actions that contra-
dicted the policies and goals of street railway management, the com-
mission could win the support of railway companies as a means for
allowing an orderly process of money making in the industry;42 and,
through encouraging investment in sound street railway projects, the
commission gained public support by helping meet the demand for more
and better street railway service.
By the time of the building of the rapid transit system, the
Board of Railroad commissioners had a wide range of powers with which
to deal with street railway companies. These, along with its pre-
stige, were to be carried over into the regulation of private enter-
prise in rapid transit in Boston. Because of its regulatory role
in the street railway industry, and the reputation it had developed
there, the board was also often assigned the role of an appellate
body by the various pieces of rapid transit legislation. In this
capacity, it was to arbitrate in disputes between the elevated rail-
way company, the subway-building commission, the municipal authorit-
ies, and the public.
Although the General Court granted charters to street railway
firms, and delegated the respcnsibillty for their regulatiorf, to the
Board of Railroad Commissioners, id did not have any power over the
location of their tracks. This was entirely a municipal and private
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enterprise matter. All of Massachusetts is within the jurisdiction
of city or town governments which traditionally have been responsible
for the regulation of the public roads. Because this power was vested
in the municipalities, streetcar companies had to obtain franchises
from local boards of aldermen or selectmen before they could lay tracks
- 43in the streets. Enabling legislation passed by the General Court
to allow towns and cities to grant franchises permitted the city to
require the company to meet certain conditions in return for the
granting of a franchise. These conditions usually took the form of
requirements that a company pave or maintain the streets upon which
it was located, and pay an annual tax fcr the franchise privilege.44
In addition, the city would specify the trethod of railway construction,
usually requiring that the rails be laid flush with the pavement, so
they would not be a hazard to other vehicles.45 This was only a nega-
tive power, however. The traction companies determined where they
should lay tracks to gain the most business. The city then could
only veto or accept these proposed locations.
As the means for building a rapid transit system were being
worked out, precedent dictated that Boston and the other cities in
the metropolitan area retain their location granting privilege when
decisions were made about rapid transit. This principle was expressed
in the requirement that the city approve elevated railway locations,
and in the delegation of subway construction and control to a city
agency. It is most likely that the city of Boston insisted upon
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retaining this privilege. As the 1892 report shows, many citizens
were disappointed with the results of the city's cooperation in the
rush to electrify its street railways in 1889.46 They probably hoped
that the city could, through reserving this power, curb the excesses
of the entrusiasm for rapid transit. The city would have more incen-
tive to do so in the case of elevateds than with street railways,
for property owners were pessimistic about the effect of adjacent
elevated railway lines on their property values,47 while streetcars
had been-encouraged as a prerequisite to land speculation.
It was in the private sector, however, that the important deci-
sions about street railway investment anc operation were made. By
deciding when and where to lay tracks, and the types of service that
would be most profitable, the traction firms had almost exclusive
power to shape Boston's transportation network up until the public
sector entered the field through its rapid transit programs. By sup-
plying the only agents who. did any transportation planning in Boston
before the eighteen-nineties, the private sector left its mark on
Boston's rapid transit system years after the public took the planning
initiative.
After an initial line from Cambridge to Boston proved the profit-
ability of horsecar transportation in 1856,48 street railway companies
proliferated in the Boston area A horde of would-be entrepeneurs
competed for franchises.49 The streetcar was seen to open wide new
possibilities, not only for better transportation, but for city growth
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and increased land values as well. "To real estate men, the simple
procedure of placing a coach on iron rails seemed a miraculous device
for the promotion of out-of-town property."50 The Board of Aldermen
of Boston and The General Court at first encouraged this proliferation
of railway lines in the belief that unrestricted competition would
be the healthiest atmosphere for the development of horsecar service. 51
However, competition tended to bring about an unprofitable duplication
of facilities. The weaker of these competing firms in neighborhoods
of Boston with an excess of street railway service were soon either
scrapped or absorbed in consolidations.
While carrying on a program of galloping competetive expansion
into Boston's suburbs, the railway companies were faced with the pro-
blem of getting their commuting patrons through narrow downtown
streets to the central business district. Such access was necessary
because companies would lose much of their business in their riders
who had to transfer to other lines to get downtown, and therefore
had to pay an additional fare. 53 The downtown streets, on the other
hand, simply could not accommodate enough tracks to allow each company
direct access to the central business district. Eventually, "the
downtown squeeze made necessary complicated lease arrangements for
competitors' use of each other's tracks."5 The entire structure
and philosophy of street railway enterprise worked against the success
of such arrangements. "The tempers of street railway employees were
not always equal to this requirement of cooperation in a field of
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intense competition. All too often, rival drivers raced for switches,
stalled, and in general interfered with each other's progress." 55
In response to the anarchic congestion caused by a policy of
fostering competition, and the prodding of traction lobbyists, the
legislature turned gradually toward a controlled street railway mono-
poly as the solution to Boston's downtown traffic problems. A law
was passed in 1886, allowing any railway company operating in the
city of Boston to consolidate with any other, subject to the approval
of the stockholders of the companies involved, and the Board of Rail-
way Commissioners. 56 Under the authority of this act, two of the
seven remaining street railways in Boston consolidated. 57
Private investors, of course, also saw advantages in street rail-
way consolidation other than the limitation of downtown congestion.
Not only would mergers decrease destructive competition; they would
also allow economies of scale in operation and make even greater ex-
pansion programs possible. The principal entrepeneur in the movement
for consolidation of Boston's street railways was Henry M. Whitney.
A steamship magnate, Whitney became interested in street railways in
the mid-eighties, as a means of promoting property he owned on Beacon
Street in Brookline. To serve his development, he formed the West
End Street Railway Company.58 Seeing the lucrative potentialities
of a consolidated street railway system under his direction, Whitney
began acquiring stock in rival companies, and promoting consolidation
both before the legislature and among street railway stockholders. 59
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In 1887, the General Court passed an act permitting Whitney's company
to consolidate with the other street railway corporations operating
in Boston. Under this act, the West End bought out four other Boston
street railway corporations. 6 0
In 1889, private enterprise made another crucial decision in
transit development. In that year, Whitney began a program of elec-
trification that soom replaced most of Boston's horsecars with elec-
tric trolley cars. The extended range of the electric streetcar
caused the West End to increase its already aggressive expansion
program. Meanwhile, in an effort to increase the volume of passen-
gers on its lines, the West End moved toward a uniform five-cent
fare throughout the city. Along with a system of cross-town lines
with free transfers, the five cent fare replaced the previous rate
system, where fares varied with the distance traveled, and an extra
fare was charged if one transfered to the lines of another company.61
Public pressure motivated much of this program. But public criticism
of Whitney's syndicate was made mostly on its own terms. The public
wanted faster, cheaper transit, and more of it. The farther out into
the country one could live, and still get into town by streecar, the
better.62 The public demanded accessibility, and Whitney was willing
to profit by providing it.
Already, a number of important transit decisions had been made
in the private sector. The location of lines, their consolidation,
and the creation of a new transit fare structure had been accomplished
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by private initiative responding to consumer demand. Even more im-
portant, the decision of a private firm to adopt the technical innova-
tion of electric power had brought about vast changes in the city
landscape. This private decision did not lead to the solution of
transit problems for which the city council of Boston approved it.
It led directly to the congestion crisis in downtown Boston in the
early nineties.
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IV. RAPID TRANSIT AS PRIVATE ENTERPRISE
Until 1891, the public sector took no initiative in the field
of rapid transit. Before that year, when the General Court appointed
a special committee to study the rapid transit needs of metropolitan
Boston, rapid transit was considered a field for private initiative
only. Government approached it as an extension of the street rail-
way industry, but not as an independent project. As was the case
with street railway development, rapid transit was not seen as an
instrument of social or land use planning except insofar as traction
and real estate promoters might use it as such in their efforts to
sell transportation and housing to the public. This was also how the
major corporate promoter of rapid transit, the West End Street Rail-
way Company, percieved rapid transit. It might be a means toward
achieving social goals, but they were really incidental to building
and operating a profitable railway enterprise.
As early as 1879, private promoters petitioned the general court
for charters to build elevated railways in Boston. These early pro-
posals were highly speculative in nature, however, and none were
accepted by the legislature.63 In 1884, an elevated company was
chartered and authorized to build a railway from Cambridge to Boston.
It constructed a test track in East Cambridge, but nothing further
came of its efforts. 64
In the late eighties, the West End took the lead in bidding for
a rapid transit franchise. In the act of the General Court authoriz-
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ing the West End merger, the new company was also permitted to build
tunnels to house its railways.65 No construction was undertaken under
this authorization, however. The company was prospering despite down-
town congestion and felt that the city should bear the expense of
tunnel construction. 66 Henery Whitney, however, soon became an avid
promoter of elevated railways as part of a larger rapid transit scheme
for Boston.67 Shortly after his consolidation program was accomplished,
Whitney began an immense public relations campaign foi elevated rapid
transit. Such a system in downtown Boston, combined with an extensive
streetcar network, he claimed, would tie together the two suburban
sectors of the city, north and south, that fed traffic into the central
68business district.68 Along with advocating an elevated rapid transit
system for its own sake, Whitney went on to promote transit as a
panacea for all sorts of social ills. Cheap rapid transit, his argu-
ment went, would promote suburbanization by putting commuting within
the means of the working class. Suburbanization of the working class
would, in turn, increase home ownership, and social mobility, thus
alleviating class conflict. By dispersing the population currently
housed in tenements, it would eliminate the social ills associated
with slums. Once connected with a system of parks and beaches, a
rapid transit system would give access to these recreational facili-
ties to all sectors of the urban population.69 At the beginning of the
last decade of the nineteenth century, many Bostonians believed their
community was on the brink of a catastrophe brought on by ethnic
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and class animosities. Whitney's pitch for rapid transit thus was
aimed at the heart of the problems that most plagued the policy
70
makers of his time. The West End, of course was hardly a social
planning agency. It was concerned with using popular social ideals
to sell its transit program to the legislature. Its planning in-
terests or capabilities hardly went beyond interpreting the evidence
that there was an excess of demand for rapid transit to and through
downtown Boston. Even so, Whitney's plan was extremely conservative.
He merely wanted one elevated line through the most congested area
in Boston. He was still willing to rely upon the streetcar everywhere
else.
The West End syndicate did not, however, stop at mere rhetroic
about the ameliorative social effects of granting their corporation
an elevated franchise. They- began an extensive lobbying campaign to
get their bill through the legislature. After first buying off the
71
other promoters who had been competing with them for the franchise,
they went to work on the General Court. This legislative body had
previously earned a reputation for being very pliable in the hands of
lobbyists for powerful private interests. Whitney followed the stan-
dard'procedures for cultivating legislative support, and his bill
was passed in 1890.72
But the West End never build its elevated. Shortly befcre the
franchise bill was passed, a member of the legislature began a cam-
paign to expose Whitney's lobbying practices.73 Though Whitney's
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political friends made sure that the investigation was safely watered
down, and though the franchise bill passed, the revelation that Whitney
had spent perhaps as much as $250,00074 to secure its passage seemed
to give Bostonians second thoughts about their rapid transit enthus-
iasm. This outrage over unethical influences in the legislature com-
plemented the growing feeling in the city that a more coherent approach
to rapid transit should be taken than that of private firms maneuver-
ing for some share of the transit profits. 75 The General Court,
therefore suspended the West End elevated franchise while a rapid
transit commission, formed in 1891, made a thorough strudy of the
problem. 76
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V. THE RAPID TRANSIT COMMISSION: THE FIRST PUBLIC INITATIVE
The establishment of the rapid transit commission represented
a fundamental change in the attitude of Massachusetts toward the"re-
lationship between public and private actors in Boston's transporta-
tion. Previously, the demand for transit in the city of Boston had
been estimated by private firms, who then took it upon themselves to
determine and implement solutions that they felt would profitably
meet the demand perceived. Government agencies, of course, had some
power in this decision-making process. They could demand that certain
minimum staidards of safety, honesty in financing, and provision of
service on established lines be met. But none had a role anywhere
near as comprehensive as that of the Rapid Transit Commission. Pre-
viously private enterprise had the initiative in rapid transit develop-
ment, and could only be acted upon negatively by regulatory agencies.
In the Rapid Transit Commission, however, the public interest gained
the initiative in rapid transit planning; and private firms could
only affect its decisions through lobbying, or, negatively, through
refusing to finance any private system it projected.
The area of the commission's initiative was comprehensive. It
was to study transportation in Boston and its suburbs, which juris-
diction the commission interpreted to be all towns within ten miles
of the State House.77  Within this area, it was to study transporta-
tion by road, railroad, and street railway.78 Though the commission
had no mandate to concern itself with the broader social questions
-33-
that figured so prominently in Whitney's rapid transit propaganda,
they did go so far as to consider their solution in terms of trends
in land use in downtown Boston. There would not be another report
dealing so comprehensively with transportation in Boston for twenty
years.
The problem of rapid transit was, to the commission, basically
one of relieving congestion in downtown Boston's narrow streets, as
described above, and providing rail access to downtown for those suburbs
that did not already have it. 79 As a partial solution, the commission
recommended an extensive street-widening )rogram in the downtown area. 80
It also sought legislation to provide for a consolidation of the
city's rail depots, at that time scattered around the periphery of
downtown, into a north and a south station. 81
But the commission's main solution to the downtown congestion
problem was conceived in terms of the street railway system. The
commission analyzed the downtown transit problem as case of a self-
reinforcing cycle of concentrated transit access, high land values,
and a concentration of commercial and financial activities, all des-
tinations for rapid transit users. They believed that proper
placement of rapid transit lines could effect a dispersal of downtown
business activities that would decrease rush hour congestion.82 Park
Square, in particular, was singed out as an area with good commercial
potential, and the commission looked upon rapid transit as a means
of encouraging commercial expansion into the Back Bay.83 The commis-
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sion proposed to do this through the construction of two rapid transit
lines passing by the peripheries of the central business district and
extending out into the suburbs. It was intended, at first , that the
elevated would supplant the streetcars currently congesting the down-
town area, particularly Tremont and Washington streets.84
It is interesting that the commission favored the use of subways
only where absolutely necessary, fearing that Bostonians would rather
do without rapid transit than travel underground.85  But even the
rapid transit trains would have to go under ground downtown, for an
elevated system on Boston's narrow commercial streets would be too
damaging to property values. An elevated on Tremont Street, which
would blight the historic Common, was out of the question for aesthetic
reasons.86
The commission also addressed the question of whether this system
would financed and operated by the public or private sector. They
remained surprisingly neutral on this point. Citing first the tradi-
tional image of governmental administration as being inept if it was
not outright corrupt, they admitted the merit of this view while empha-
sizing that it was a rather overworn assertion of the conventional
wisdom.87  In favor of public administration, the commission cited
the experience of public commissions which had supervised the build-
ing of sewer systems.88 While granting that there were precedents
that demonstrated the feasibility of an all-public system, the
commission inclined more toward the granting of a franchise to a pri-
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vate firm. This was done in the belief that the enterprise would be
attractive to private bidders, and that such a means of providing
rapid transit would be most inexpensive to the public, and most in
line with the existing methods of operating streetcar and railroad
lines in Massachusetts.89
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VI. THE TOO AGENTS ESTABLISHED TO IMPROVE BOSTON'S TRANSIT FACILITIES:
THE PUBLIC BOSTON TRANSIT COMMISSION, AND THE PRIVATE BOSTON
ELEVATED RAILWAY COMPANY
In 1893, the legislature set about acting upon the Rapid Transit
Commission's recommendations. Subject again to private pressures,
and financial constraints, they did not enact the commission's uni-
fied elevated-subway solution to the rapid transit problem. Instead,
they attempted to solve separately the two transit problems facing
Boston. A subway would be built to remove the streetcars from the
most congest3d area, and an elevated line would be superimposed upon
the entire existing streetcar system.
Two bills were passed by the General Court in 1893 relating to
rapid transit. One established as a branch of the Boston city govern-
ment the Boston Subway Commission. This body, consisting of three
members appointed by the city of Boston, was empowered to lay out and
construct a subway under Tremont Street.90 Upon completion of the
subway, the city could compel the removal of surface car tracks on
Tremont Street and contract for the use of the subway with street
railway companies at a rate of compensation to be determined by the
91,Board of Railroad Commissioners. Such a subway measure had been
against the desires of the West End Company, the only traction firm
ir, any position to make use of it, for a number of reasons. First,
the company did not want to incur the expense of building tunnels of
its own, although it had been authorized to do so since 1887.92 A
M Ilbibraries
Document Services
Room 14-0551
77 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02139
Ph: 617.253.2800
Email: docs@mit.edu
http://libraries.mit.edu/docs
DISCLAIM ER
Page has been ommitted due to a pagination error
by the author.
-38-
city-built tunnel would offer even more difficulties for the company.
Not only, through the rent it would have to pay for the use of the
subway, would it have to bear the expense of the tunnel's construction;
but it would also have none of the control over the tunnel that owner-
ship would grant it. Certainly one of the factors that encouraged
the city council of Boston to endorse the bill was that it extended
the principle of city control of railway location to underground
structures, and in fact gave the city positive power to determine that
location for the first time.
The other act passed was to establish a Metropolitan Transit
Commission, which would be empowered to accuire a strip of land for
the location of an elevated railway in Boston.93 Once again, the
route within which the railway would be located was to remain in public
hands. This elevated would run from Franklin Park to Causeway Street,
and in downtown Boston was to run on a narrow strip of land between
Tremont and Washington Streets.94 Because of this characteristic,
the elevated scheme became known as the "alley route". Despite the
public ownership of the right of way, this plan closely approximated
Whitney's original plan, and won the West End's endorsement. 95 This
system would have had just the opposite of the decentralizing effect
that the Rapid Transit Commission included in its program for an ele-
vated system. It would also have required heavy expenditures for the
acquisition and demolition of private property,96 while threatening
with destruction many historic buildings in the downtown area.97 This
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elevated plan was rejected by the citizens of Boston in a referendum
in the fall of 1893.9
Rapid transit maneuvering continued in the legislative session
of 1894. By this time H. M. Whitney had resigned the presidency of
the West End to pursue more lucrative opportunities. 99 Without his
leadership, the influence of the West End in rapid transit develop-
ments dwindled until it was leased to the new Boston Elevated Railway
Company in 1897.100 The latter organization was incorporated to build
elevated railways in Boston in 1894. It was the descendant of an
earlier firm chartered in 1884 to construct an elevated from Cambridge
to Boston Thi company owned patents on an innovative type of ele-
vated railway, known as the Meigs system after its inventor. In 1894,
with new backers, Meigs sought incorporation as the Boston Elevated
Railway Company.101 Unlike Whitney, this group of entrepeneurs did
not want merely to augment an existing streetcar system with one rapid
transit line through the downtown area. They had visions of an entire
network of elevated railways super-imposed on the existing street
railway system.102 To do this economically, this syndicate hoped to
run trains on the esoteric Meigs railway system through existing
streets in the city.
While the would-be Boston Elevated Railway Company was lobbying
for its corporation charter in the legislature, the Subway Ccmmission
was also promoting a bill that would expand its powers to build sub-
ways. Believing that the route it had been granted was insufficient
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to really attack the congestion problem, the commission asked to be
granted a longer location in Tremont Street.103 As finally amended,
their bill granted them this authorization, put two appointees of the
Governor on the commission, and assigned it several other public works
tasks in the Boston region. Its name was changed at this time to the
Boston Transit Commission.104 Essentially, the act expanded the func-
tion of the commission from that of a single-purpose body responsible
for building one subway to a general-purpose organization involved in
a variety of public construction projects in the transportation field.
These two proposals before the 1894 legislative session were
opposed to each other in a couple crucial aspects. One would authorize
the construction of a new transportation network in Boston, based on
a mode of transportation completely new to the city. The other was
part of a program to ameliorate Boston's congestion problem by putting
an existing transportation mode underground. The first act sought to
solve Boston's transportation problems through a new private initiative,
and the second sought authorization for public action on the problem.
Neither measure seemed to have much chance of gaining the General Court's
approval until the backers of the two bills joined forces and united
their measures for legislative consideration. 105 The joint bill passed,
and, mostly because of the popularity of the subway measure, passed
a special referendum of Boston's electorate. 106 Neither part of the
bill was in any way contingent upon, or related to, the other.107
The new corporation and the commission were entirely independent bodies,
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pursuing their separate ends.
The rapid transit act of 1894 went a long way toward undoing the
work of the Rapid Transit Commission of 1891. The report of that
commission had seemed to point the way toward an integrated rapid
transit system under public supervision, if not actual public operation.
This transit system had been worked out by the transit commission, a
public planning body, to achieve certain public ends. At the same
time, this body attempted to establish a transit system that would be
profitable enough to attract private investment. The act of 1894, on
the other hand, succeeded in dividing the responsibility for rapid
transit between two bodies, one public, the other private, that were
completely independent of each other. The responsibilities of these
two new agencies were not necessarily complementary. One was merely
interested in creating a new location for the operation of streetcars.
The other was formed to introduce a whole new mode of transportation
to the city of Boston. This division of responsibility and power would
be a source of conflict in years to come.
Along with establishing this division of responsibility, the act
implicity turned over to the private sector a great deal of the
planning power that had been claimed for the public by the rapid transit
commission. The public really was given little more control over the
Boston Elevated Railway Company than it was over an ordinary street
railway company. The additional power the public claimed over the
private elevated company in the act of 1894 was all in the area of
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financing:
The legal status of the Boston Elevated Railway Company
is materially different from that of other electric
railway companies in the commonwealth. It pays a spec-
ial tax, its dividends are under special limitation, it
is subject to special duties relative to the streets,
it is exempted from the statute prividing for half fares
for school children, and the fare for a continuous pas-
sage to the same general direction over all lines which
it owns, leases or controls is limited to a maximum of
five cents. This special status arises from a provision
in the company's charter which is generally considered to be
be a contract with the Commonwealth and which will
remain in effect for twenty-five years from 1897, or
until 1922, unless sooner modified or abrogated by
agreement between the company and the Commonwealth.1 08
The company was given the same power as a streetcar firm in deciding
where to locate its lines, and how it would set up itsoperation in
relation to existing transportation facilities. 109
The Boston Transit Commission, accepting the wider scope granted
it by the legislature, began to consider itself an authority with a
definite responsibility for the development of a transit system in
Boston. It eventually took up problems of subway and station
110 ill1location, streetcar versus elevated train service, and the nature
and location of subway line intersections.112 Though it retained a
basically engineering approach to its responsibilities, in time it
came to take on some of the planning responsibilities that had been
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the concern of the Rapid Transit Commission.
The elevated company underwent its own unrelated process of
evolution. The exotic and rather untried Meigs system turned out to
be not nearly the attractive investment its promoters had hoped. 113
Its uncertain financial status added to the obstacles it encountered
in acquiring a location franchise from the city of Boston. The city
council felt that the elevated company had been granted too much
power by the legislature. It was objected that there was not a suffi-
cient guarantee that the company would pay adequate compensation for
damages to property owners in whose streets it had located.114  It
was suggested by some that the railway had been formed, and sought
its franchise, for purely speculative reasons, with no intention of
actually constructing a railway. 115 The inadequate financial condition
of the company for its proposed construction program (it applied to
the city council for all of the locations approved by the legislature
at once) lent credence to this accusation.116  Finding these objections
convincing, the city council allowed the company's application to
languish in committee. 117
It was not until 1896, when J. P. Morgan and a group of Boston
financiers bought out the original owners of the elevated franchise,118
that the Boston Elevated Railway Company showed any signs of life
again. Though the management of the firm remained in local hands,
it was now backed by the financial resources of Morgan's Bank which
caused a significant rise in its prestige. Once again, through pri-
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vate initiative, elevated railways were established as a viable part
of Boston's rapid transit program. Once this change in management
had been made, the company petitioned for, and received, a new charter
from the legislature. In several important ways, this bill reinforced
the initiative given the private sector in 1894.
In order to run its elevated through downtown Boston, according
to the act of 1894, the company would have had to pay very high dam-
ages, or use a tunnel in the downtown area.119  Yet the West End
Company had acquired exclusive use of the only existing tunnel, the
Tremont Street Subway, for twenty years from the transit commission
7 ot120in return Tor an annual rent of 4 7 % of the cost of the subway.
In order to be able to use the subway for elevated trains, the new
Boston Elevated Company requested from the legislature the right to
lease the West End system from its stockholders. 121  It was granted
this right, subject to the approval of the Board of Railroad Commis-
sioners. 122 To avoid the city's continued obstruction of an elevated
railway construction program, the company was given the right to
appeal municipal disapproval of its application for locations to the
Board of Railroad Commissioners.123 This was significant, because
the constituencies of the city council and the railroad commission
included different interest groups. While the city council represent-
ed the interests of local businessmen and property owners, the consti-
tuency of the railroad commission consisted of railroad and street
railway firms, and their passengers. Thus, rapid transit was given
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priority by the legislature over local interests in business and land
use. Once again, the type of goals for rapid transit planning suggested
by the 1892 rapid transit report were repudiated. This priority of
commuters over business and property owners along rights-of-way appears
to have continued throughout the development of the rapid transit
system from this time on. The division of interests of council and
board was indicated by the topics they were to consider in approving
the railway company's methods of elevated construction. The mayor
was to approve the plans with regard to "architectural appearance and
obstruction to light and air",124 while the Board of Railroad Cormis-
sioners were to consider the "strength and safety of the structure...,
and with reference to the rolling stock, motive power, method of
operation, and with reference to the convenience and comfort of the
public... "25 The location of stations was left to the company and
railroad commission, except in the case of stations in narrow streets,
where the city's approval was also required.126
Another crucial decision of the legislature was the determination
of the fare to be charged by the new company. It was stated in the
act of 1897, as it had been in the 1894 charter, that the new company
could charge a maximum fare of five cents, and must provide adequate
facilities for free transfers.127 So, once the elevated leased the
West End, the maximum fare for traveling anywhere by rapid transit
in Boston, as long as it was in one general direction, could not
exceed five cents.128 Neither could the legislature reduce this rate
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for twenty years. 129 The late eighteen-nineties were a period of
consistent deflation, and boom years for the street railway business.
Reformers, therefore, felt that the company had wrested an incredible
guarantee of rising profits from the legislature. 130 In the conflict
resulting from this provision, the continuation of current economic
conditions was taken for granted by both sides. Railway stockholders
and reformers both saw it as an assurance that railway fares would
not be reduced with deflation. Neither side considered the contingency
of a period of inflation, when a ceiling on fares would be detrimental
to company revenues.
Immediately after the passage of the 1897 bill into law, the
elevated company applied to the city for a portion of the routes
granted to it in 1894. These were for a line from Roxbury to Charles-
town, following Washington Street, and a branch line following Atlantic
Avenue and rejoining the main line at North Station. The Washington
Street line was to pass through downtown via the New Tremont Street
Subway, which the company would modify for this purpose.132 Since
the Board of Railway Commissioners had the power to overrule the city's
decision, it seems that its approval was handled largely as a formality
in contrast to the filibuster of three years before.
Despite some public apprehensions the elevated company was appar-
ently willing to build an elevated system of good technical quality.
Both the city and the board approved its plans in short order, and
with its solid financial support arranged, construction commenced
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immediately. The elevated opened for operation in the summer of 1901,
and immediately gained great popularity with the public.133 At the
same time, construction by the Boston Transit Commission went forward
on the East Boston Tunnel and the Longfellow Bridge, both of which were
designed to carry rapid transit trains.134 ~Fie basic physical outlines
of Boston's rapid transit system were quickly being established.
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VII. PUBLIC-PRIVATE CONFLICT
The new, aggressive management of the Boston Elevated Railway
Company, backed by the resources of the nation's largest finance Banker,
sought to make the most financial gain of its new charter. To do this
they embarked upon several attempts to undermine public control over
rapid transit policy. This drive for greater private control resulted
in conflicts over the nature of the elevated company's lease of the
West End Street Railway Company, and a lengthly dispute over possession
of the city's subway tunnels. In both of these areas of conflict,
public control prevailed. From the assertion of public control in
these disputes followed a fifteen-year period of rapid transit expan-
sion in which a spirit of cooperation between public and private
appeared to prevail.
Two provisions of the elevated contract for the lease of the West
End were vetoed by the Board of Railroad Commissioners. One would
have guaranteed the West End stockholders an annual dividend of 8% of
the par value of their shares1 35 The railroad commission found that
since the West End's stock was watered, this rental would have resulted
in a dividend of about 12% on the actual value of the stock.135 It
also felt that the proposed duration of the lease of ninety-nine years
was excessive, and not in the public interest.137 After some negotia-
tion, the West End and Elevated consented to a reduction in the rental
to 7% and a reduction in the length of the contract to 25 years, to
coincide with the duration of the elevated's charter. 1 3 8
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Even with these alterations, reformers felt that the company had
scored a real coup for its investors.139 But by the standards of
nineteenth century railroad regulation in Massachusetts the board had
done its duty well. As in all previous decisions relating to public
transit in Boston, the fundamental definition of the public-private
interaction in this case had been determined by the legislature, and
the legislature was quite accessible to the elevated company's lobby-
ists. In its reports on the contract, the board expressed its doubt-
about the benefit to the public interest of some of the provisions of
the act of 1897;140 but it was not within the board's power to change
the law. Within the area of its discretion, it worked for the most
conservative execution of the privileges granted the Boston Elevated
Railway Company possible.
There was still, however, no stable working relationship established
between the public and private agents involved in rapid transit develop-
ment. This was the result of the expansionist ambitions of the pri-
vate elevated railway company. In 1899, the company introduced a
bill to the legislature that would have allowed it to purchase the
Tremont Street tunnel from the city.141  This tunnel, of course, was
the only public owned part of the rapid transit system at the time,
and formed an essential link through the narrow neck of Boston between
the northern and southern halves of the railway network. 142 The legis-
lature passed this bill, but the governor got a referendum provision
attached to it as a condition for his signature. After an active cam-
paign against the measure by reformers in the city, Boston's voters
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defeated it in the fall.143 In 1900, the city began to plan a second
subway link through the downtown area, this time in the vicinity of
Washington Street.144 The elevated company threatened to not lease
this new tunnel. The company once again introduced its own bill into
the legislature, this time granting it the right to build and own the
new subway. This bill would allow the city to buy the subway provided
that the company would retain exclusive rights to its use for fifty-
years.145 The Boston Associated Board of Trade, represented by
Louis Branceis, led the fight against the elevated's proposed legis-
lation. It drafted its own bill, and organized a group of financiers
to operate the new subway if the elevated refused it. 146 The reformer's
lobbying brought the company's legislative campaign to a standstill.
The company signified defeat by requesting the legislative committee
who were in charge of the bill to postpone consideration of it until
the next year's session. 147
The elevated company mounted an even more aggressive campaign in
1901. Bringing to bear all of its forces of patronage and campaign
contributions, the elevated gained overwhelming support in the legis-
lature. This was largely a partisan phenomenon, as the elevated had
established close ties with the Democratic party, particularly in the
city of Boston. Several of the members of the Board of Directors
of the elevated company were large Democratic campaign contributors,
and a couple were prominent public figures in the party as well. 149
The company had also established strong friendships with local poli-
ticians in the party as a source of patronage jobs. In the same way
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that ward machines distributed public offices, the elevated company
bartered jobs for votes.150 Aside from this, many more disinterested
politicians favored privatization of the subway as a means of saving
expense to the city. 151 While both houses of the legislature prepared
to pass the bill, the reformers prevailed upon the governor to
announce he would veto the bill if it contained no provision for a
referendum. The legislature passed the bill without a referendum
provision, the governor vetoed it, and his veto was upheld. 15 2
Aside from the issue of legislative corruption, which added much
moral force to the opposition of the elevated's bill , the main concern
of the refcrmers was a conservative one. They sought to uphold the
public-private relationships as Hitherto established in public transit
in Massachusetts. This bill would have subverted the city's control
of the public thoroughfares. It was therefore entirely out of line
with previous franchise arrangements. Also, several provisions of the
bill would have allowed the company to water its stock, a practice long
forbidden by Massachusetts securities regulations. 153
In the following year, 1902, the company accepted a subway bill
that provided for a more traditional franchise arrangement. 154In
doing this, the company confirmed the reformers' belief that the company
could operate profitably under such a franchise, and was only doing
wat it could to get the most favorable arrangement possible out ot
the legislature.155 Until it became clear during the first World War
that the tradional public-private relationship in rapid transit was
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no longer profitable, the company allowed it to stand for the most
part unchallenged. As rapid transit continued to expand in Boston,
conflict was confined to issues of technical detail. Such matters
as disputes over quality of service and station location continued
to come up, but these did not challenge the fundamental public-private
relationship, and institutions and procedures existed to solve them
more or less automatically.
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VIII. PUBLIC-PRIVATE EQUILIBRIUM 1902 - 1918
The public-private relationship established for rapid transit in
Boston by the legislation of 1894 - 1902 prevailed without any other
attempts to make major changes until 1918. During this sixteen-year
period, the Boston Elevated Railway Company was under contract to
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to provide a rapid transit service
for metropolitan Boston. The company provided this service under the
general supervision of the Board of Railway Commissioners. After 1913,
this function was performed by the Public Service Commission, a new
public utility regulating body that absorbed the powers of the rail-
road commission. 156 The Boston Transit Commission continued to con-
struct subways and tunnels, which it leased to the Elevated Company.
The company also constructed extensions to its elevated system, and
a subway in Cambridge. The determination of where these new facili-
ties would be located was made by the general court, after consult-
ing the company, the transit commission, and the railroad commission
(or the public service commission).
There seem to be two significant characteristics to be considered
in an evaluation of this system of public-private cooperation. First
it should be seen if adequate provision was made for Boston's present
and future transit needs. This should include consideration of both
planning and new construction nrojects, and supervision of existing
services to meet the needs of the public. Second, the effects of
this system on the financial prosperity of the Boston Elevated Rail-
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way Coroany should be considered. A system of private provision of
public service under government regulation cannot exist unless there
is a financial incentive for private firms to participate.
This period was one of consistent expansion in rapid transit
facilities in Boston. Practically all of Boston's rapid transit sys-
tem was completed by 1918. The East Boston Tunnel was opened in
1904.157 The Washington Street subway went into operation in 1908.158
The elevated from Dudley Street to Forest Hills was completed in
1909.159 The Cambridge subway opened in 1912,160 as did the elevated
to Lechmere Square. The Boylston Street subway opened in 1914,161
and the subway to Dorchester was completed as far as Andrew Station
by 1918.16)2 With the completion of the Cambridge subway in 1912,163
the total investment in rapid transit facilities in metropolitan
Boston was brought close to $100,000,000.164 The company claimed
that the cost it incurred in building and equipping the Cambridge
subway was equal to about one-ninth the assessed valuation of the
city of Cambridge, at that time a city of 105,000 population.165
This extensive construction program, however, was accomplished
piecemeal. Accounts of the process of the rapid transit construction
program in Boston all have a one-thing-after-another feeling about
them. No sooner was one piece of the system authorized, and con-
struction began, than another was proposed and approved by the general
court. At no time was a complete, step-by-step building program
set out by anybody, public or private. Construction simply seemed
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to follow the public demand for rapid transit as it grew through
this period.
Typically, the legislature would authorize the Boston Transit
Commission to issue bonds, and use the funds so acquired to build a
subway from one general area to another, taking the route in between
deemed most appropriate by the commission and the elevated railway
company. This led to long disputes over subway location, and some-
times utter confusion when the path of a newly authorized subway
intersected an already constructed one. The East Boston Tunnel
terminated at Court Street for twelve years, for instance, until it
was finally decided whether, and in what manner, to connect it to
the Tremont Street subway at Scollay Square.166 A delaying debate
also occurred over whether to terminate the Boylston Street subway
at Park Street, or at Post Office Square. 167 This lack of planning,
however, seems to be much more of a result of governmental attitudes
than of limitations imposed by private ownership of the railway
system. For instance, when the general court commissioned a compre-
hensive study of rapid transit in Boston in 1914, it appropriated
$5,000 for the project. A study of similar scope of the transporta-
tion situation of Philadelphia going on at the same time had been
appropriated $130,000.168
The major respect in which private ownership of the railways
entered into plans for expansion of the transit system was that the
Boston Elevated Railway Company would have to agree to participate
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in the project before its construction would become feasible. The
Boston Elevated Railway Company was, effectively, the only private
firm in a position to operate rapid transit facilities in Boston.
If the company felt that its resources would be overextended by
equipping and operating a new subway, it would not be compelled to
make expenditures for rent or equipment for such a project. This
became an important problem toward the end of this period, as the
price of the elevated's stock fell, and it encountered fifficulty
169 -eaon
in raising new capital. The public policies that limited the amount
of private capital that was interested in entering the rapid transit
industry probably were the most effective expression of rapid transit
expansion policy in the long run.
In the operation of the rapid transit system, a spirit of bureau-
cratic cooperation developed between the elevated company and the Board
of Railway Commissioners.. Both seemed to have parallel policies of in-
creasing and improving service. The policy of street railway companies
traditionally had been to make heavy capital investments and charge
low fares to gain the greatest volume of traffic. 170 The elevated
apparently was no exception in this respect. Once the firm realized
that there were limitations on the power it would be granted in the
rapid transit system it set about the operation of its facilities
in a responsible manner. During this period, the elevated company
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expanded its rapid transit trains from three to eight cars, and
enlarged its stations accordingly. It created a multitude of new
free transfer points throughout the city. At the same time, it was
responding to the recommendations of the railroad commission to im-
prove its volume of streetcar service, stations, and transfer facili-
ties. Through the intervention of the railroad and public service
commissions, the companyr remained very responsive to demands on the
part of the public for improvements in service.
Once again, there was a certain haphazardness about this ex-
pansion process. The railroad commission, in general, did not
act except upon complaints of the railway's patrons, or the munic-
pal governments within whose boundaries it operated. The company
and the petitioner would both be heard before the comission. Many
of these petitions, of course, were legitiimate, but some were
instances of local interest groups attemping to acquire service
from the railway that would not be profitable, or that other-
wise the company was not obligated to render. The commission would deter-
mine if a complaint was valid, and either dismiss it, or recommend
improvements to the company. Only on rare occasions would the rail-
road commission engage in a more general study of any transit problem.
This would usually happen when a number of related complaints were
brought before the commission at the same time, or if a more general
issue was raised. After ruling on the validity of the complaint, or
complaints, the commission would then make specific recommendations
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to the company of modifications. Only in this very fragmented manner
did the commission affect the quality of transit in Boston. Of course,
this method of operation allowed a great deal of public participation
in the improvement of transit facilities. It could have been comple-
mented, though, by more initiative in planning by government. As
long as the initiative for improving service was left with either the
company or with private individuals, with the commission arbitrating
between the two, the emphasis in regulation would be on the company
fulfilling its contractual obligations, rather than serving any more
general public goals that might have been aided by its cooperation.
Of course, a cooperative venture in public service undertaken by
the public and private sectors cannot succeed unless it offers a
reasonable return to the private agent. This was the major failure
of the system of public-private cooperation in Boston's rapid transit
system. The deterioration of the financial position of the Boston
Elevated Railway Company was brought about by several factors. Some
of these were associated with the way the public-private relationship
functioned; most resulted from external economic conditions to which
the public and private agencies, for various reasons, were not pre-
pared to respond.
The principal economic change for the transit industry during this
period was the rise of street railway operating costs. This trend
had been going on from the beginning of the twentieth century. The
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rate of increase in costs picked up rapidly after 1913, and skyrocketed
once the United States entered the first World War.172 By 1918, mat-
erials and wages cost street railway firms on the average of 75% more
than in 1913. And in 1913, they cost about 20% more than they had in
1900. 173
Along with its rising operating costs, the firm encountered in-
creased maintenance and replacement expenses as its original track
and rolling stock wore out. Like most street railway companies, the
Boston elevated had not allocated sufficient funds to pay for the
depreciation and obsolescence of its equipment.174 By 1918, the ori-.
ginal track and rolling stock of the West End street railways would
be thirty years old, and overdue for replacement.175 Yet this was
precisely the time that the company was having difficulty meeting its
operating costs, much less replacing its used equipment.
The continuous expansion of the rapid transit system also imposed
heavy burdens upon the company's finances. Though the company received
increased revenue from the larger volume of traffic it could carry
through the subways, it also had to bear the expense of equipping them
for operation, and to pay rent for their use.176 In a situation
where most private companies would want to retrench, the elevated
was committed to a program of continued expansion.
Two major flaws in the structure of the elevated's relationship
with the public agencies in rapid transit drove it to the verge of
bankruptcy. One was the fixed five-cent fare. Only an act of the
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legislature could have allowed the elevated to make a fare increase.
This, of course, would have been a very unwise move for any Boston
politician to support, as th-e five-cent fare was an institution among
his constituents. It might by argued, however, that even had the
company not been subject ot a special regulation in this respect, it
would have found itself in grave difficulty. Neither the company's
management, nor the Public Service Commission were prepared to respond
to the problem of inflation. Even as late as 1915, the commission
dismissed the lack of prosperity demonstrated by the Elevated Company
as the result of temporary economic conditions, rather than a long-
term trenc. In cases involving applications for rate increases
by other street railway companies in Massachusetts, the commission
was very hesitant to approve higher fares. Several of these firms
went bankrupt during the months they waited to be grarted fare increases
by the commission. 178  It was difficult to unlearn quickly the stereo-
type of traction as a profitable and expanding industry.
The other problem embodied in this structure was that the only
source of compensation received by the railway for its service was
the fares paid by its passengers. This system of compensation was
for the most part taken for granted by the actors in the transit sys-
tem. It was reflected in the policy of the railroad commission that
che company could not be expected to provide any service that would
not pay for itself. One of the primary reasons for public initiative
in the field of rapid transit was that there was a public interest
involved in this service that would not be reflected in the allocation
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of transit service by laissez-faire economics. It was only the
immenent collapse of the Boston Elevated Railway Company that con-
vinced the public that this consideration might be a factor that
could demand additional compensation for the railway, as well as one
that demanded that the railway sacrifice opportunities to reap specu-
lative profits in order to better serve public goals.179
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IX. CONCLUSION
The solution to the crisis of the rapid transit system adopted
by The General Court in 1918 involved an abandoning of the public-private
operation of rapid transit in favor of a public-managed system. Under
this arrangement, the Commonwealth leased the Boston Elevated Railway
Company from its stockholders and put a publicly appointed Board of
Trustees in charge of its management. The company was released from
the contrcl of any other regulatory body, as the trustees were given
authority to determine fares and service policy. The trustees were
authorized to set fared at a level that would cover the cost of ser-
vice. In return for their reliquishing management power, the stock-
holders were given a guaranteed dividend.180
Given the structure of assumptions under which the rapid transit
system was operated, this was the best solution to the- financial
difficulties of the elevated company that could be obtained. As long
as the cost of rapid transit operation was to be covered by passenger
fare revenue, and economic conditions in the industry were undergoing
rapid change, it was best that the company and the public agency
responsible for its regulation be closely coordinated. By combining
the two, the closest sort of coordination could be achieved. However,
this sort of coordination was also needed in decision making about
rapid transit expansion programs and service, In both of the latter
categories, the major need for coordination actually was for coordina-
tion between public agencies with responsibility for rapid transit
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planning. This issue seems to have been left unresolved by the move-
ment to a trusteeship.
By looking at a few alternatives to the system adopted by the
Commonwealth in 1918, one can get a better sense of the issues involved
in abandoning the public-private rapid transit program. The first
alternative would have involved the retention of the cost of service
principle. However, instead of increasing fares, the services that
were least profitable, or most costly to the company could have been
abandoned. It seems, though, that quality of service was more important
to rapid transit policy makers than its low price. It was believed
that demand for rapid transit would not be so elastic as to be decreased
by increased fared to the extent that use of the rapid transit system
would be severely diminished.181 Though elasticity of demand for rapid
transit was mostly a matter of conjecture for Massachusetts legislators
and traction firm executives,182 their decision to raise fares indicates
that they believed rapid transit to be an essential public service.
Another alternative would have been to revise the fare structure.
The flat fare system clearly did not reflect the cost to the railway
company of an individual's trip on the system. A zonal fare system,
with fares reflecting the distance traveled would have been more
appropriate for this purpose. This sort of system was considered by
the public service commission in 1915. But it was rejected, mainly
because it was felt that the flat fare system was more conducive to
suburbanization.
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The zone system, as applied in foreign countries,
terds to create congestion of population as there
is a progressive increase of fares in proportion
to the distance travelled from the center of the
city. Under the flat fare system, on the other
hand, where a relatively long ride is permitted
without an increase of fare, persons of moderate
means are encouraged to reside in the suburban
districts where they can enjoy the benefits of
cheaper land, lower rents and better light and
. 183
air.
Rapid transit was expected to perform secondary social
well as just move people from one place to another.
functions as
From the rejection of these two alternatives, it is clear that
the public agents involved with rapid transit regulation in Boston
felt that it was an essential public service and that'the external
effects generated by the system were also a major justification for
its continued existence in the form to which is had evolved under
combined public and private administration. It seems, therefore, that
compensation of the elevated company for these effects with a subsidy
from tax revenue would have been a reasonable alternative solution
of the financial difficulties of the public-private system. This,
however, was considered too radical a departure from previous policy.184
The commonwealth's resorting to a public trusteeship, therefore,
represented a fundmental ambivalence about the role of rapid transit,
though this would not be really clearly revealed until the transit
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system began to face heavy competition from the automobile in the
twenties. Was it merely a profit-making venture granted a valuable
franchise by the state, to which public service was an incidental
feature of its operations? In this case it would merely be a private
transportation service whose users should pay for the service they
received, if it were more than this, a mode of transportation whose
existence had determined the course of growth in the city of Boston
for thirty years and upon which the existence of that city had become
dependent, it should have been preserved even at a higher cost than
its individual users were willing to pay for it. The former role
was accepted as the principle behind the contractual relationship
between the company and the Commonwealth established by the transit
acts of 1894 and 1897. The latter role, that of serving a larger
public interest, was the one assumed by the company or imposed upon
it by the public sector between 1902 and 1918. It was as well the
sort of role that the Rapid Transit Commission had anticipated for
a private rapid transit firm as early as 1892.
The public-private relationship governing rapid transit in Boston
between 1902 and 1918 administered one of the most fruitful phases of rapid
transit development in the city. It was responsive to the needs of
its users. Though it failed to develop much capability for long-range
planning, the process of regulation of the Boston Elevated Railway
Company by the Board of Railroad Commissioners did provide a system
of checks and balances between the public interest and private profit-
-66-
making. The pr.ivate sector in this system was profitable enough to
attract sufficient capital to finance the construction of a large part
of the system. The criterion of profitability of the system, balancec
against the demands that the public interest be served by it, was not
the most appropriate one to represent the interests of the private
sector in the system. It was limited, first of all , by the maximum
five-cent fare. And, second, it was not a complete measure of the
value of the system. Had the system continued to develop along the
lines established in this period, rather than having been restrained
by its rigid contractual arrangements resulting from earlier conflicts,
this problem would very likely have been resolved, and the privatized
system preserved.
-67-
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abrams, Rischard M., Conservatism in a Progressive Era: Massachusetts
Politics 1900 - 1912. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964.
Barnes, Irston R., Public Utility Control in Massachusetts. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1938
Blodgett, Geoffrey, The Gentle Reformers: Massachusetts Democrats
in the Cleveland Era. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966.
Boston City Council, Reports of Proceedings, 1894 - 1897.
Boston Elevated Railway Company, Annual Report, 1897 - 1918.
Boston Elevated Railway Company, Statutes, Surface Railway Leases,
Contracts for the Use of Subways and Tunnels: 1887 - 1912.
Boston: George H. Ellis Co., 1912.
Boston Elevated Railway Company, Fifty Years of Unified Transportation
in Boston, 1938.
Boston Transit Commission, Annual Report, Vol. 1-24 (1895 - 1918).
Kirkland, Edward Chase, Industry Comes of Age: Business, Labor, and
Public Policy 1860 - 1897. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967.
Mason, Edward S., The Street Railway in Massachusetts. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1932.
Massachusetts Board of Railroad Commissioners, Annual Report, 1898 - 1912.
Massachusetts General Court. Report of the Special Committee on the
Relations Between Cities and Towns and Street Railway Companies,
1898.
Massachusetts Public Service Commission, Annual Report, 1913 - 1918.
-68-
BIBLIOGRAPHY CONTINUED
Massachusetts Rapid Transit Commission, Report to the Legislature,
1892.
Warner, Sam B., Streetcar Suburbs: The Process of Growth in Boston
1870 - 1900. Cambridge: Harvard University Press and MIT Press,
Atheneumj 1970.
Wiebe, Robert H., The Search for Order: 1877 - 1920. New York:
Hill and Wang, 1967.
-69-
FOOTNOTES
1. Sam B. Warner, Streetcar Suburbs. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, Atheneum, 1970.
2. Ibid., pp. 161 - 162.
3. Ibid., pp. 15 - 16.
4. Ibid., pp. 16 - 17.
5. Ibid., pp. 24 - 25.
6. Massachusetts Rapid Transit Commission, Report to the Legislature,
1892., p. 9.
7. Ibid., p. 7.
8. Ibid., p. 10.
9. Boston Transit Commission, Fifth Annual Report (1899)., p. 7.
10. Ibid., p. 7.
11. Edward S. Mason, The Street Railway in Massachusetts. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1932., p. 7.
12. Boston Elevated Railway Company, Fifty Years of Unified Transpor-
tation in Metropolitan Boston, 1938., p. 46.
13. Warner, op. cit., p. 28.
14. Rapid Transit Commission, pp. 8 - 9.
15. Ibid., p. 9.
16. Richard M. Abrams, Conservatism in a Progressive Era: Massachu-
setts Politics 1900 - 1912. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1964., p. 3.
-70-
FOOTNOTES CONTINUED
17. Geoffrey Blodgett, The Gentle Reformers: Massachusetts Democrats
in the Cleveland Era. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1966., pp. 105 - 106.
18. Abrams, op. cit., pp. 1 - 5, 7.
19. Blodgett, pp. 106 - 107.
20. Abrams, op. cit., pp. 71 - 73.
21. Blodgett, op. cit., p. 106.
22. Ibid., p. 113.
23. Irston R. Barnes, Public Utility Control in Massachusetts.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930., p. 6.
24. Ibid., p. 7.
25. Ibid., p. 6.
26. Ibid., p. 7.
27. Ibid., p. 8.
28. Mason, op. cit., p. 134.
29. Barnes, op. cit., p. 11.
30. Ibid., p. 10.
31 Ibid., pp. 12 - 13.
32. Ibid., p. 12.
33. Ibid., p. 12.
34. Mason, op. cit., pp. 139 - 140.
35. Barnes, op. cit., p. 13.
36. Mason, op. cit., p. 141.
-71-
FOOTNOTES CONTINUED
37. Ibid., p. 138.
38. Abrams, op. cit., p. 5.
39. Barnes, op. cit., pp. 12 - 13.
40. Abrams, op. cit., p. 40.
41. Mason, op. cit., pp. 138, 140.
42. Barnes, op. cit., p. 13.
43. Massachusetts General Court, Report on the Special Committee on
the Relations Between Cities and Towns and Street Railway Com-
panies. 1898., p. 14.
44. Ibid., pp. 17 - 18.
45. Ibid., p. 18.
46. Rapid Transit Commission, p. 9.
47. Ibid., pp. 81 - 82.
48. Fifty Years of Unified Transportation in Boston, pp. 10 - 11.
49. Warner, op. cit., p. 23.
50. Ibid., p. 23.
51. Fifty Years of Unified Transportation in Boston, p. 13.
52. Warner, op. cit., p. 23.
53. Ibid., p. 26.
54. Ibid., pp. 24 - 25.
55. Ibid., p. 25.
56. Board of Railroad Commissioners, Annual Report for the Year 1908.,
p. 60.
-72-
FOOTNOTES CONTINUED
57. Ibid., pp. 160 - 161.
58. Warner, op. cit., pp. 25 - 60.
59. Ibid., pp. 25 - 26.
60. Board of Railraod Commissioners, Annual Report for the Year 1908.,
pp. 161 - 163.
61. Warner, op. cit., p. 26.
62. Ibid., p. 26.
63. Fifty Years of Unified Transportation in Boston, pp. 36 - 38.
64. Ibid., p. 45.
65. Ibid., p. 33.
66. Blodgett, op. cit., p. 123.
67. Ibid., pp. 123 - 124.
68. Ibid., p. 123.
69. Ibid., pp. 123, 125.
70. Ibid., pp. 123 - 124.
71. Ibid., p. 110.
72. Ibid., pp. 109 - 110.
73. Ibid., p. 109.
74. Ibid., p. 110.
75. Fifty Years of Unified Transportation in Boston, pp. 34 - 35.
76. Ibid., p. 35.
77. Rapid Transit Comission, p. 4.
78. Ibid., p. 4.
-73-
FOOTNOTES CONTINUED
79.
80.
81
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
Ibid., p. 66.
Rapid Transit Commission, 1892.
Ibid.
Rapid Transit Commission, p. 67.
Ibid., p. 68.
Ibid., p. 65.
Ibid., p. 6
Ibid., pp. 83 - 84.
Ibid., p. 98.
Ibid., p. 100.
Rapid Transit Commission, pp. 98 - 100.
Mass. Acts of 1893, Chapter 478, Section 2.
Mass. Acts of 1893, Chapter 478, Section 7.
Blodgett, op. cit., p. 124.
Boston Transit Commission, First Annual Report (1895), p. 4.
Ibid., p. 4.
Blodgett, op. cit., p. 124.
Boston Transit Commission, First Annual Report (1895), pp 7 - 8.
Blodgett, op. cit., p. 124.
Boston Transit Commission, First Annual Report (1895), p. 4.
Blodgett, op. cit., p. 124.
Warner, op. cit., p. 124.
Fifty Years of Unified Transportation in Boston, pp. 45 - 46.
-74-
FOOTNOTES CONTINUTED
102. Ibid., p. 46.
103. Boston Transit Commission, First Annual Report (1895), p. 5.
104. Ibid., p. 6.
105. Boston Evening Transcript, 2 July 1894, p. 1.
106. Ibid., 3 July, 1894, p. 4.
107. Ibid, 3 July, 1894, p. 1.
108. Public Service Commission, Annual Report (1915), pp. 411 - 412.
109. Mass. Acts of 1894, Chapter 548, Sections 7, 15 - 18.
110. Boston Transit Commission Ninth Annual Report (1903), pp. 13 - ~6.
Tenth Annual Report (1904), p. 35.
111. Board of Railroad Commissioners, Annual Report (1899), p. 95.
112. Boston Transit Commission, Ninth Annual Report (1903), p. 6 - 7.
113. Fifty Years of Unified Transportation in Boston, p. 47.
114. Boston City Council, Report of Proceedinqs, 25 March 1895.
115. Ibid., 3 April 1895.
116. Ibid., 21 January 1895.
117. Ibid., 3 April 1895.
118. Fifty Years of Unified Transportation in Boston, p. 47.
119. Mass. Acts of 1894, Chapter 548, Section 8.
120. Boston Transit Commission, Third Annual Report (1897), pp. 10 -
11.
121. Fifty Years of Unified Transportation in Boston, p. 47.
122. Mass. Acts of 1897, Chapter 500, Section 11.
-75-
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
FOOTNOTES CONTINUED
Ibid., Section 14.
Ibid., Section 6.
Ibid., Section 6.
Mass. Acts of 1894, Chapter 548, Section 10.
Mass. Acts of 1897, Chapter 500, Section 10.
Ibid., Section 10.
Ibid., Section 10.
Abrams, op. cit., pp. 72 - 73.
Boston City Council, Report of Proceedings, 21 July 1897.
Fifty Years of Unified Transportation in Boston, p. 57.
Abrams, op. cit., p. 72.
Mass. Acts of 1897, Chapter 500, Sections 15, 17.
Abrams, op. cit., p. 64.
Ibid., p. 64.
Board of Railroad Commissioners, Annual Report (1898), pp
149.
Abrams, op. cit., pp. 64 -65.
Ibid., p. 65.
Board of Railroad Commissioners, Annual Report (1898), pp
142.
Abrams, op. cit., p. 66.
Ibid., p. 66.
Ibid., p. 66.
. 148 -
. 141 -
-76-
FOOTNOTES CONTINUED
- 67.
- 68.
- 69.
- 70.
- 71.
it., p. 16.
f Unified Transportation in Boston, p. 73.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.!
Ibid.!
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Barne!
Fifty
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
p. 66.
p. 66.
pp. 66
p. 67.
pp. 67
pp. 68
p. 68.
p. 69.
p. 69.
pp. 69
p. 71.
pp. 70
, op. c
Years o
p. 73.
p. 73.
p. 73.
p. 73.
, p. 73.
, p. 73.
p. 73.
p. 73.
, p. 73.
-77-
FOOTNOTES CONTINUED
167. Boston Transit Commission, Nineteenth Annual Report (1913),
p. 4.
168. Public Service Commission, Annual Report, (1915), p. 395.
169. Mason, op. cit., p.
170. Warner, op. cit., pp. 26, 28 - 29.
171. Board of Railroad Commissioners, Annual Report,
277.
172. Mason, op. cit., p. 15.
173. Ibid., p.
(1908), pp.
15.
174. Fifty Years of Unified Transportation in Boston, p. 83.
175. Mason, op. cit., p. 164.
176. Ibid., p. 164.
177. Public Service Commission, Annual Report (1915), p. 417.
178. Mason, op. cit., pp.
179. Ibid., pp. 163 - 165.
156 - 160.
180. Fifty Years of Unified Transportation in Boston, p.
181. Mason, op. cit., pp. 126 - 127.
182. Ibid., p. 125.
183. Public Service Commission, Annual Report, (1915), p. 413.
cit., pp. 174 - 177.
164.
275 -
80.
184. Mason, op.
